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Abstract—This study explores to what extent migration has contributed to
improved living standards of individuals in Tanzania. Using a thirteen-
year panel survey, we find that migration between 1991 and 2004 added
36 percentage points to consumption growth. Although moving out of
agriculture resulted in much higher growth than staying in agriculture,
growth was always greater in any sector if the individual physically
moved. As to why more people do not move given the high returns to
geographical mobility, analysis finds evidence consistent with models in
which exit barriers set by home communities prevent the migration of
some categories of people.
I. Introduction
FINDING routes out of poverty remains a key issue forhouseholds and policymakers alike. A long-term vision
of development suggests that poverty reduction is asso-
ciated with intergenerational mobility out of rural areas and
agriculture and into urban nonagricultural settings. Physical
and economic mobility seem to go hand-in-hand. Standard
economic theory has multiple narratives of how physical
and economic mobility interact. The Lewis model offers a
stylized description of rural transformation, with sector
mobility of labor from agriculture into ‘‘modern’’ produc-
tion processes. At least in its original specification, the
model suggests an initial gap in earnings between rural and
urban locations (Lewis, 1954).1 The Harris-Todaro model
emphasizes the migration process and the fact that relative
individual earnings incentives matter, so that both pull and
push factors drive migration. A gap between rural and
expected urban earnings drives migration. Unemployment
(or an informal sector offering low earnings) would never-
theless allow an actual gap between urban and rural wages
to persist, with the premium a function of the unemploy-
ment rate (Harris & Todaro, 1970). Other work, such as on
the ‘‘new economics of migration’’ (Stark & Bloom, 1985),
emphasizes that migration is part of a general livelihood
strategy for the initial household as a whole. Migration is
part of a welfare-maximizing strategy with a clear role for
overall household income growth, but also a role for risk
sharing. For example, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) find
that migration patterns for marriage in rural India are con-
sistent with the risk-sharing strategies of the initial house-
hold. Recent evidence has highlighted not just the role of
networks in facilitating migration from home areas, but also
how migration is closely linked to migrants’ access to social
networks in destination areas (Munshi, 2003) and to com-
munity rates of out-migration (Kilic et al., 2009).
Although the emphasis on the process of migration in
most recent empirical work has provided many insights,
few of these studies convincingly address the question of
whether migration leads to improved living conditions. A
major problem is having access to data that allow a careful
and convincing assessment of the relative welfare of
migrants and nonmigrants, due to the standard evaluation
problem: an individual cannot be observed to be both a
migrant and a nonmigrant. A few studies have access to
experimental data, such as international migration lotteries
(McKenzie, Gibson, & Stillman, 2010), but most studies
have to work with nonexperimental data. Without experi-
mental data, the key concern, unobserved heterogeneity
affecting both outcomes and the process of migration, per-
sists. This leads to the quest for imaginative and convincing
instruments for migration (see the review of the migration
and poverty literature by McKenzie & Sasin, 2007). An
additional hurdle is the need for panel data to study migra-
tion and economic mobility. The costs and difficulties of
resurveying means that attrition may be relatively high for
this group and may also result in the loss of some of the
most relevant households for the study of this process
(Beegle, 2000; Rosenzweig, 2003).
This paper uses unique data from a region in Tanzania to
address the question, What is the impact on poverty and
wealth of physical movement out of the original commu-
nity? Although we do not have experimental data, the nat-
ure of our data allows us to limit the potential sources of
unobserved heterogeneity. Building on a detailed panel sur-
vey conducted in the early 1990s, we reinterviewed indivi-
duals in 2004, making a notable effort to track individuals
who had moved.
The tracking of individuals to new locations proves cru-
cially important for assessing welfare changes among the
baseline sample. The average consumption change of indi-
viduals who migrated was more than four times greater than
that of individuals who did not move. Those who had
moved out of Kagera by 2004 experienced consumption
growth that was ten times greater compared with those who
remained in their original community. These averages
translate into very different patterns of poverty dynamics
for the physically mobile and immobile. For those who
stayed in the community, the poverty rate decreased by
about 4 percentage points over the thirteen years. For those
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who moved elsewhere within the region, the poverty rate
decreased by about 12 percentage points, and for those who
moved out of the region, the poverty rate decreased by 23
percentage points. Had we not tracked and interviewed peo-
ple who moved out of the community, a practice that is not
carried out in many panel surveys, we would have seriously
underestimated the extent to which poverty decreased dur-
ing 1991 to 2004 in Kagera; we would have reported pov-
erty reduction at about half its true value. Clemens and
Pritchett (2008) raise similar concerns in the context of
income growth and international migration. Furthermore,
the tracking and reinterviewing enabled us to collect valu-
able information about pathways out of poverty.
Still, these statistics do not provide evidence that moving
out of the community leads to higher income growth. As
noted above, we cannot observe the counterfactual: What
would income growth have been for migrants had they not
migrated? We exploit some unique features of the data to
address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. First,
individual fixed-effects regressions for movers and stayers
produce a difference-in-difference estimation of the impact
of physical movement, controlling for any fixed individual
factors that affect consumption. Second, we can control for
initial household fixed effects in the growth rate of con-
sumption because we observe baseline households in which
some individuals migrate and others do not. This controls
for observable and unobservable factors fixed to the family
that can affect the growth rate of consumption. Thus, we
identify the impact of migration on income using within-
household variation in migration. Unlike most other studies
of migration, our identification does not rely on household
shocks, distances to possible destinations, or the existence
of family networks at the destination to identify the migra-
tion decision. Such variables are likely to have an impact
on the income of those migrating as well as those staying
behind, and so the exclusion restriction will not be satisfied.
In our study, we are able to move beyond these approaches;
in addition to using panel data on migrants and nonmi-
grants, we compare siblings and other relatives who were
living together at the baseline.
These estimations address many possible sources of het-
erogeneity, such as (genetic) health and ability endow-
ments; risk aversion; wealth constraints; and market, risk,
and environmental circumstances. We find that movement
out of the community results in 36% higher consumption
relative to staying. Comparison of the results with and with-
out fixed effects suggests that migrants are more likely to
be from families with greater potential for growth in earn-
ings.
A weakness of this approach, however, is the implicit
assumption that within families, migration is random,
which is a strong assumption. For example, in view of the
standard Harris-Todaro model of individual migration,
earnings differentials drive migration, so those who are
observed to have migrated from within a household tend to
have had greater earning potential than those who stayed
behind, implying that within-family migration may not
be random.2 We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) meth-
ods to deal with this potential endogeneity. We assert that
opportunities to migrate depend on the interaction of house-
hold circumstances with the individual’s status and position
within the household at baseline. The 2SLS estimates show
limited evidence of unobserved individual heterogeneity
affecting consumption growth. In short, unobservables at
the household level correlated with growth potential appear
to matter, whereas individual heterogeneity does not.
We explore two additional avenues of interest. First, does
migration to urban areas drive the results? Second, does
migration capture changes in the sector of work that would
explain the consumption growth we observe? We find sug-
gestive evidence that physical mobility has an independent
effect beyond its association with moving out of agriculture
or moving to a more urban area. We use these results in
conjunction with the literature on network externalities and
poverty traps to explain why, if migration has such large
payoffs, more people do not move. We conclude that the
findings are consistent with models in which exit barriers
are set by home communities (through social and family
norms), preventing migration of certain categories of people
when windows of opportunity arise. Being willing and able
to leave behind what you know appears to be a strong deter-
minant of economic mobility. There is no evidence of finan-
cial constraints to migration.
In the next section, we provide the context of changes in
economic fortunes in Tanzania in the past decade. Section
III presents the data used in the analysis, and section IV
provides the basic indicators we use to assess economic and
welfare changes. Section V briefly describes the method we
use to assess the impact of migration, section VI presents
the results, and section VII carries out some robustness
checks. Section VIII builds a narrative around the regres-
sions and aims to explain why more people do not migrate
when the benefits of doing so are so high.
II. The Setting: Tanzania and Kagera, 1994–2004
Between 1994 and 2004, Tanzania experienced a period
of relatively rapid macroeconomic growth, attributed to lib-
eralization, a renewed trade orientation, a stable political
context, and a relatively positive business climate that
helped to boost economic performance. Real GDP growth
was on the order of 4.2% per year between 1994 and 2004,
and annual population growth was around 3.2% (United
Republic of Tanzania, 2004). There is also evidence that
growth accelerated in the last few years of the period com-
pared with the 1990s. However, growth was not sufficiently
broad-based to result in rapid poverty reduction. On the
basis of the available evidence, poverty rates declined only
slightly, and most of the progress in poverty reduction was
2 This is correct, even if, in equilibrium, when no further migration
takes place, expected earnings are equal.
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in urban areas. According to the Household Budget Survey
(HBS), between 1991 and 2000/01, poverty declined from
39% to 36% in mainland Tanzania. The decline in poverty
was steep in Dar es Salaam (from 28% to 18%) but minimal
in rural Tanzania (from 41% to 39%).
For the purposes of this study, it is useful to consider the
Kagera region specifically. The region is far from the capi-
tal and the coast, bordering Lake Victoria, Rwanda, Bur-
undi, and Uganda. It is overwhelmingly rural and primarily
engaged in producing bananas and coffee in the north and
rain-fed annual crops (maize, sorghum, and cotton) in the
south. Relatively low-quality coffee exports and agricul-
tural produce are the main sources of income. Mean per
capita consumption was near the mean of mainland Tanza-
nia in 2000. Likewise, the region appeared to mirror the rest
of the country in terms of growth and poverty reduction:
real GDP growth was just over 4% per year between 1994
and 2004, while poverty in Kagera is estimated to have
fallen from 31% to 29% between 1991 and 2000/01
(Demombynes & Hoogeveen, 2007).
The challenges of poverty reduction in Kagera seem to
be representative for provincial Tanzania as a whole: some
pockets, such as Dar es Salaam, have had substantial
growth and poverty reduction, but this has not spread to
other areas. This reflects the typical problem of landlocked,
agriculture-based economies: how to deliver poverty reduc-
tion if the main engine of growth appears to be elsewhere
(De Weerdt, 2010).
III. The Data
The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS)
was originally conducted by the World Bank and Muhim-
bili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS) and
consisted of about 915 households interviewed up to four
times from fall 1991 to January 1994 at intervals of six to
seven months (see World Bank, 2004, and http://
www.worldbank.org/lsms/). The KHDS 1991–1994 serves
as the baseline data for this paper. Initially designed to
assess the impact of the health crisis linked to the HIV-
AIDS epidemic in the area, it used a stratified design to
ensure relatively appropriate sampling of households with
adult mortality. Comparisons with the 1991 HBS suggest
that in terms of basic welfare and other indicators, the
KHDS can be used as a representative sample for this per-
iod for Kagera (although not necessarily for the rest of Tan-
zania; the results are available on request).
The objective of the KHDS 2004 survey was to reinter-
view all individuals who were household members in any
round of the KHDS 1991–1994 and who were alive at the
last interview (Beegle, De Weerdt, & Dercon, 2006). This
effectively meant turning the original household survey into
an individual longitudinal survey. Each household in which
any of the panel individuals lived would be administered
the full household questionnaire. Because the set of house-
hold members at the baseline had subsequently moved, and
usually not as a unit, the 2004 round had more than 2,700
household interviews (from the baseline sample of 912
households).
Although the KHDS is a panel of respondents and the con-
cept of a ‘‘household’’ after ten to thirteen years is a vague
notion, it is common in panel surveys to consider recontact
rates in terms of households. Excluding households in which
all previous members were deceased (17 households with 27
people), the field team managed to recontact 93% of the
baseline households. This is an excellent rate of recontact
compared with panel surveys in low-income and high-
income countries. The KHDS panel has an attrition rate that
is much lower than that of other well-known panel surveys
summarized in Alderman et al. (2001), in which the rates
ranged from 17.5% attrition per year to the lowest rate of
1.5% per year, with most of these surveys covering consider-
ably shorter time periods (two to five years).
Figure 1 charts the evolution of households from the base-
line to 2004. Half of all households interviewed were track-
ing cases, meaning they did not reside in the baseline com-
munities. Of those households tracked, only 38% were
located nearby the baseline community. Overall, 32% of all
households were neither located in nor relatively close to
the baseline communities. While tracking is costly, it is an
important exercise because migration and dissolution of
households are often hypothesized to be important responses
to hardship and a strategy for escaping poverty. Excluding
these households in the sample raises obvious concerns
regarding the selectivity of attrition. In particular, out-migra-
tion from the village, dissolution of households, and even
marriage may be responses to changing economic or family
circumstances. Tracking surveys provide a unique opportu-
nity to study these responses: who uses them, their effects,
and whether they get people out of poverty.
Turning to the recontact rates of the sample of 6,352
respondents, table 1 shows the status of the respondents by
age group (based on their age at first interview in the 1991–
1994 rounds). The surviving older respondents were much
more likely to be located, which is consistent with higher
migration rates among the young adults in the sample.
Among the youngest respondents, more than three-quarters
were successfully reinterviewed. Excluding people who
died, 82% of all respondents were reinterviewed. Table 2
shows the location of the respondents. Without tracking,
reinterview rates of surviving respondents would have
fallen from 82% to 52% (2,780 of 5,394 survivors). Non-
local migration is important: restricting the tracking to
nearby villages would have resulted in 63% recontact of
survivors. Migration also proved to be an important factor
in determining whether someone was recontacted. Respon-
dents who were not traced were much more likely to reside
outside Kagera (43%) compared with their counterparts
who were reinterviewed (8%).
The consumption data come from an extensive consump-
tion module administered in 1991 and again in 2004. The
consumption aggregate includes home-produced and pur-
1012 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
chased food and nonfood expenditure. The nonfood compo-
nent includes a range of nonfood purchases, as well as utili-
ties, expenditure on clothing and other personal items,
transfers out, and health expenditures. Funeral expenses
and health expenses prior to the death of an ill person were
excluded. Monetary levels were adjusted to account for spa-
tial and temporal price differences, using price data col-
lected in the Kagera survey in 1991 and 2004, and, for
households outside Kagera, data from the National House-
hold Budget Survey. Consumption is expressed in annual
per capita terms. The poverty line is set at 109,663 Tanza-
nian shillings (TSh), calibrated to yield for our sample of
respondents who remained in Kagera the same poverty rate
as the 2000/01 National Household Budget Survey estimate
for Kagera (29%). At the time of the survey one U.S. dollar
was worth around TSh 1,100.
FIGURE 1.—KHDS 2004: RECONTACTING RESPONDENTS AFTER TEN OR MORE YEARS
TABLE 2.—KHDS REINTERVIEW RATES, BY LOCATION
Number Location %
Baseline sample 6,352
Reinterviewed 4,432
Same community 63.1
Nearby community 14.1
Elsewhere in Kagera 14.4
Other region 7.1
Other country 1.3
Untraced 962
Kagera 56.6
Dar es Salaam 12.3
Mwanza 10.4
Other region 7.9
Other country 5.5
Don’t know 7.3
Deceased 958
Location for untraced respondents is reported by other household members from the baseline survey
who were successfully located, interviewed, and able to provide location information on the respondent. In
some cases, this information comes from other relatives or neighbors residing in the baseline communities.
TABLE 1.—KHDS INDIVIDUALS, BY AGE
Age at Baseline,
1991–1994 Recontacted Deceased Untraced
Reinterview Rate
among Survivors
<10 years 1,604 (77.1%) 160 (7.7%) 317 (15.2%) 83.5%
10–19 years 1,406 (73.2%) 104 (5.4%) 412 (21.4%) 77.3%
20–39 years 823 (63.3%) 285 (22.1%) 190 (14.6%) 81.2%
40–59 years 436 (70.6%) 147 (23.9%) 34 (5.5%) 92.8%
60þ years 163 (37.6%) 262 (60.4%) 9 (2.1%) 94.8%
Overall 4,432 (69.7%) 958 (15.1%) 962 (15.1%) 82.2%
Sample of individuals ever interviewed in KHDS 1991–1994 and alive at last interview. Age categories are based on age at first interview.
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IV. Growth, Poverty, and Physical Mobility in Kagera
In this section, we discuss changes in living standards
overall and the changes for four mutually exclusive groups
based on residence in 2004: (a) still residing in the baseline
community, (b) residing in a neighboring community, (c)
residing elsewhere in Kagera, and (d) residing outside
Kagera.
Table 3 shows that the basic needs poverty rate declined
8 percentage points in the full sample. This figure masks
significant differences in changes between subgroups based
on migration. For those found residing in the baseline com-
munity, poverty rates dropped by 3 percentage points, but
rates dropped by 11, 12, and 23 percentage points for those
who moved to neighboring communities, elsewhere in
Kagera, and outside Kagera, respectively. A similar pattern
is found for consumption per capita. Although mean con-
sumption per capita grew by TSh 61,903 overall, or 38%, it
grew by only 17% for those found in the same community
and by 37%, 56%, and 161% for those who moved to neigh-
boring communities, elsewhere in Kagera, and outside
Kagera, respectively. Dividing consumption into food and
nonfood components gives the same result. The most basic
assessment of welfare changes would have been wrong if
we had focused only on individuals still residing in the
community, a practice found in many panel data surveys.
We would have underestimated the growth in consumption
by half of its true increase.
For the groups in table 3, the differences in consumption
changes are statistically significant, as shown in table 4.
Excluding respondents who have relocated would omit
those with greater rates of income growth and poverty
reduction. Table 5 reports confidence intervals for the incre-
mental samples (which are not mutually exclusive); it gives
a more detailed picture of how inference on consumption
growth and poverty reduction would have changed if we
had not tracked movers. It is apparent that inference from a
‘‘simple’’ panel survey of respondents continuing to reside
within the original communities would have produced
underestimates of actual consumption growth and poverty
reduction in this population.
These conclusions are robust across the distribution of
consumption, as well as at the mean and the poverty line.
Panel A in figure 2 depicts the cumulative density function
TABLE 4.—DIFFERENCES IN CONSUMPTION AND POVERTY HEAD COUNT CHANGES,
BY MOBILITY CATEGORIES
N
Average
Change
t-Test for Equality
Change between
Both Subgroups
Consumption per capita (TSh)
Stayed in community 2,620 25,940 t ¼ 13.93
Moved elsewhere 1,496 120,534 p ¼ 0.0000
Stayed in same or
neighboring community
3,197 31,432 t ¼ 16.67
Moved elsewhere 919 160,820 p ¼ 0.0000
Stayed in Kagera 3,792 41,460 t ¼ 20.25
Moved elsewhere 324 281,064 p ¼ 0.000
Poverty head count (%)
Stayed in community 2,620 0.034 t ¼ 5.41
Moved elsewhere 1,496 0.140 p ¼ 0.000
Stayed in same or
neighboring community
3,197 0.047 t ¼ 5.11
Moved elsewhere 919 0.162 p ¼ 0.000
Stayed in Kagera 3,792 0.059 t ¼ 4.94
Moved elsewhere 324 0.231 p ¼ 0.000
TABLE 3.—AVERAGE CONSUMPTION MOVEMENTS OF PANEL RESPONDENTS, BY 2004 LOCATION
Mean 1991 Mean 2004 Difference in Means N
Consumption poverty head count (%)
Full sample 0.34 0.27 0.07*** 4,116
Within community 0.35 0.31 0.03*** 2,620
Nearby community 0.33 0.21 0.11*** 577
Elsewhere in Kagera 0.36 0.24 0.12*** 595
Out of Kagera 0.30 0.07 0.23*** 324
Consumption per capita (TSh)
Full sample 164,434 226,337 61,903*** 4,116
Within community 159,959 186,474 26,515*** 2,620
Nearby community 171,493 234,973 63,480*** 577
Elsewhere in Kagera 167,597 260,749 93,152*** 595
Out of Kagera 180,707 472,474 291,767*** 324
Food consumption per capita (TSh)
Full sample 106,805 146,701 39,896*** 4,116
Within community 104,184 121,725 17,541*** 2,620
Nearby community 111,207 152,624 41,417*** 577
Elsewhere in Kagera 108,763 166,379 57,616*** 595
Out of Kagera 115,704 303,453 187,749*** 324
Nonfood consumption per capita (TSh)
Full sample 57,629 79,636 22,007*** 4,116
Within community 55,775 64,748 8,973*** 2,620
Nearby community 60,286 82,348 22,062*** 577
Elsewhere in Kagera 58,834 94,369 35,535*** 595
Out of Kagera 65,003 169,021 107,018*** 324
Significance of the difference with the 1991 value using a paired t-test. *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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for consumption per capita for those who remained in the
same community. Panels B, C, and D show the cumulative
density functions for respondents residing in neighboring
communities, elsewhere in Kagera, and outside Kagera. For
respondents who were located farther from their location in
1991, the differences between the functions for 1991 and
2004 are more pronounced. For people who remained in the
baseline community, the 1991 and 2004 distributions lie
close to each other under the poverty line and diverge above
it; for the other mobility categories, there is greater diver-
gence.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 offer another cut of the data, compar-
ing consumption of nonmovers to movers in 1991 when
both were living in the same community (panel A) and in
2004 (panel B). There is almost no difference between
(future) nonmovers and movers in 1991, but by 2004, we
FIGURE 2.—CUMULATIVE DENSITY FUNCTIONS OF CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (TRUNCATED AT TSH 500,000)
The vertical line is the basic needs poverty line (TSh 109,663).
TABLE 5.—SAMPLE SIZE, MEAN, STANDARD ERROR, AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL FOR INCREMENTAL SAMPLES
N Mean SE 95% CI
Change in consumption per capita (TSh)
(1) ¼ Only those who remained in community 2,620 25,940 3,057 19,945 31,935
(2) ¼ (1) þ those who moved to neighboring communities 3,197 31,432 2,878 25,790 37,074
(3) ¼ (2) þ those who moved elsewhere within Kagera 3,792 41,460 2,985 35,609 47,312
(4) ¼ (3) þ those who moved outside Kagera Region (¼ full sample) 4,061 56,392 3,259 50,003 62,782
Change in poverty head count (%)
(1) ¼ Only those who remained in community 2,620 0.034 0.012 0.058 0.010
(2) ¼ (1) þ those who moved to neighboring communities 3,197 0.047 0.011 0.068 0.025
(3) ¼ (2) þ those who moved elsewhere within Kagera 3,792 0.059 0.010 0.078 0.039
(4) ¼ (3) þ those who moved outside Kagera (¼ full sample) 4,061 0.068 0.009 0.087 0.049
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observe divergent income levels. The divergence is greater
between those who stayed and those who moved farther
away (figures 4 and 5).
What drives the association between migration and
income growth? One plausible explanation is that migrants
are relocating to less remote, less poor areas. By 1991, 68%
FIGURE 4.—CUMULATIVE DENSITY FUNCTIONS OF CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA WITHIN COMMUNITY VERSUS ELSEWHERE IN KAGERA (TRUNCATED AT TSH 500,000)
The vertical line is the basic needs poverty line (TSh 109,663).
FIGURE 3.—CUMULATIVE DENSITY FUNCTIONS OF CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA WITHIN COMMUNITY VERSUS NEARBY COMMUNITY (TRUNCATED AT TSH 500,000)
The vertical line is the basic needs poverty line (TSh 109,663).
FIGURE 5.—CUMULATIVE DENSITY FUNCTIONS OF CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA WITHIN COMMUNITY VERSUS OUTSIDE KAGERA (TRUNCATED AT TSH 500,000)
The vertical line is the basic needs poverty line (TSh 109,663).
1016 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
of the sample was living in rural villages, of which a little
more than half were categorized by the survey team as
poorly connected in terms of infrastructure. The remainder
of the sample were living in (or close to) the regional capi-
tal, Bukoba (17%), or other small urban centers in Kagera
(14%). Table 6 investigates whether moving to a better-
connected center (for example, from a poorly connected to
a better-connected village or from a rural area to an urban
center) is correlated with higher consumption growth.3 This
is indeed the case: about 10% of the sample moved to a
better-connected area, and they experienced 90% consump-
tion growth on average. For those who moved to a similar
area, consumption increased by 46% on average, while those
who moved to a less urban or less-connected center experi-
enced a lower increase at 28%. Clearly, it matters where
people move, but moving in itself seems to matter too.4
Another plausible source of income growth for migrants
is that they have moved to a different sector with respect to
income. In table 7, we explore whether migration is corre-
lated with change in occupation or sector. Consumption
growth was highest for those who moved into nonagricul-
ture (67%), and there was considerable growth for those
who started in nonagriculture. It is striking that the 10%
who moved into agriculture from nonagriculture faced
declining consumption, suggesting that this is a sign of
hardship and possibly a means of coping with it. Table 8
reports consumption growth by both sector change and
migration. A considerable number of people switched sec-
tors without migrating but, within each category of sector
status, migrants had much higher consumption growth than
nonmigrants. The main source of income matters for con-
sumption growth, but it is strongly related to migration as
well. For example, those who moved out of agriculture
while also moving out of their original community in this
period more than doubled their consumption levels, while
those who switched into agriculture while staying within
the community faced a 12% reduction in consumption.
V. Assessing the Impact of Migration on Consumption
Outcomes
The correlations above do not resolve whether this con-
sumption growth is in fact directly related to migration or
whether it is spurious. To investigate this further, we ex-
plore several empirical approaches. First, we employ a dif-
ference-in-difference estimator, comparing the consump-
tion growth of those who moved with those who stayed in
their baseline community. We define ln Cit as the natural
logarithm of consumption per capita for individual i in per-
iod t, and Mi as a dummy that is 1 if the individual was
found to have physically moved out of the original commu-
nity between t and t þ 1, and 0 otherwise. The difference-
in-difference specification is
Dln Citþ1;t ¼ aþ bMi þ cXit þ dih þ eit; ð1Þ
in which Dln Citþ1,t is (ln Citþ1  ln Cit), the growth rate of
consumption per capita in the household in which i is resid-
ing in the two periods. This specification controls for indivi-
dual fixed heterogeneity, which might have an impact on
the level of consumption in each period. This resolves a
large number of possible sources of endogeneity, such as
risk aversion or ability, which are likely to affect both
migration and income outcomes. However, it does not
TABLE 6.—MEAN AND MEDIAN CONSUMPTION GROWTH BY MOVE TO MORE OR
LESS REMOTE AREA, 1991–2004
Mean Median N
Did not move 0.13 0.16 2,147
Moved out of community 0.53 0.50 1,080
Out of those that moved out of community:
Moved to more remote area 0.28 0.21 380
Moved to similar area 0.46 0.45 378
Moved to less remote area 0.90 0.86 322
Remoteness is based on the changes in classification among six possibilities: in order of remoteness,
island in Lake Victoria, remote village, connected village, urban center, district capital, and regional
capital.
TABLE 7.—MEAN AND MEDIAN CONSUMPTION GROWTH BY SECTOR ALLOCATION
CHANGE, 1991–2004
Mean Median N
Stay in agriculture 0.21 0.22 1,721
Move out of agriculture into nonagriculture 0.69 0.67 408
Stay in nonagriculture 0.43 0.43 172
Move into agriculture from nonagriculture 0.05 0.03 245
Total 0.28 0.27 2,546
TABLE 8.—MEAN CONSUMPTION GROWTH BY SECTOR ALLOCATION AND PHYSICAL
MOVEMENT, 1991–2004
Stayed in
Community
Moved out of
Community All
Stay in agriculture 0.18 0.29 0.22
(1,248) (473) (1,721)
Move out of agriculture
into nonagriculture
0.42 1.04 0.67
(201) (207) (408)
Stay in nonagriculture 0.11 0.88 0.44
(88) (84) (172)
Move into agriculture
from nonagriculture
0.12 0.00 0.03
(157) (88) (245)
Total 0.18 0.49 0.27
(1,694) (852) (2,546)
3 Tables 6 and onward are restricted to the sample in the main regres-
sions (N ¼ 3,227). From the full sample of 4,432, we exclude, in this
order: 715 people who were not interviewed in wave 1 (they were inter-
viewed in waves 2, 3, and/or 4), 15 people in one-person households, 267
people missing either wave 1 or wave 5 consumption expenditure, 120
people missing peer’s schooling, 2 people missing parental education,
and 86 people with incomplete data in wave 1. Tables 7, 8, and 12 have
2,546 observations because of missing occupational data for 2004.
4 In order to investigate the clustering of migration patterns, all house-
holds were sorted into tracking zones, indicating the geographical area in
which they resided in 2004. Tabulating, for each tracking zone, the vil-
lage of origin of the households tracked in that zone did not reveal any
discernable pattern of clustered migration. In each tracking zone, there
was never any origin village that dominated, with the exception of vil-
lages that lie within or neighbor the tracking zone.
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address concerns about heterogeneity among families or
individuals affecting growth in consumption and the migra-
tion decision. For example, current wealth may affect the
ability to migrate as well as the potential to grow between t
and t þ 1. McKenzie and Sasin (2007) discuss at length the
issue of endogeneity with respect to measuring the impact
of migration on poverty, stating that work that does not
identify causal relations provides ‘‘rather weak grounds for
policy recommendations.’’ McKenzie et al. (2010) find that
ignoring selection led to overstating the gains from migra-
tion from Tonga to New Zealand.
Our data, while not experimental, still offer excellent
opportunities to control for a wide set of factors in this
respect. First, we have data on multiple individuals from
the original household, which allows us to control for any
initial household-level heterogeneity (dih) that may affect
the growth of consumption by estimating equation (1) using
initial household fixed effects (IHHFE). The result is that
the impact of migration is identified using variation within
the initial household: differences between members of the
same initial household, effectively controlling for initial
growth paths. Second, we can control for a set of individual-
level factors that may affect consumption growth, and
possibly migration as well, by including these as Xi in
regression model (1). The variables used as individual con-
ditioning variables for the growth of consumption from
baseline are individual variables (sex, age, education rela-
tive to age-specific peer groups,5 and marital status) and
family background variables (number of biological children
in the initial household at baseline interacted with the age-
sex group of the children, the number of biological children
living elsewhere interacted with the distance to the regional
capital, and the years of education of the biological mother
and father). We also include a variable indicating whether
the individual lost both parents between 1991 and 2004,
allowing a separate effect if the individual was below age
15 at baseline. Quite a few of these variables, such as edu-
cational level, marital status, parental death, or having chil-
dren living elsewhere (offering opportunities for remit-
tances), are likely to affect migration, but also may have
direct effects on consumption growth.
Despite controlling for fixed individual heterogeneity
and both fixed and time-varying household-level heteroge-
neity (including initial growth paths) and the additional
control variables, unobserved individual factors may still
affect migration as well as consumption growth. We extend
the analysis to 2SLS estimates, using three types of
variables for instruments for the migration decision: pull
factors, push factors, and variables reflecting social rela-
tionships.
The pull factors include age and baseline location.
Migration opportunities and incentives are typically stron-
ger for young male adults, as employment in low-skill and
physically demanding activities is likely to be easier for
them. Similarly, if a family were to decide who should
migrate to capture opportunities, then allowing a young
male adult to go would seem sensible. Costs and informa-
tion needs for migration may well be affected by how far
the opportunities are located. We include an interaction
term of the distance to the regional capital and whether the
person is male and between 5 and 15 years old at the base-
line (so between 18 and 28 in 2004) as a measure of the
opportunities available.6
Individuals may also be pushed into migration (or
families may decide to send someone) when shocks occur.
We include a measure of economic shocks experienced by
the household by including a measure of negative rainfall
shock. Using data from 21 weather stations in Kagera from
1980 to 2004, each of the 51 baseline villages was mapped
to the nearest station, and 25-year average annual rainfall
was computed. The largest deviation of rainfall between
1992 and 2002 from the long-run average was identified.
This rainfall shock variable was interacted with being in the
5-to-15 age group as a measure of this push factor (with
higher values defined as high-deviation rainfall).
Finally, norms and social circumstances are likely to
affect migration. In particular, within a household, who is
able or expected to migrate is likely to be determined by
the individual’s position in the household. We include indi-
cators for being the head or spouse of the household head at
the baseline. We expect these two positions in the house-
hold would make it less likely that the person would leave
relative to others in the household. Age rank among those
between 5 and 15 (with the oldest receiving the highest
value) is also included. These indicators are unlikely to
determine the consumption growth of the household, but
may well affect whether a person is allowed, chosen, or
chooses to migrate. Finally, close family members, the clo-
sest relatives of the household head, sons and daughters,
may have different probabilities of leaving the household’s
community, compared with other residents, such as cousins
or nephews. Local norms on marriage are patrilocal: girls
5 We used the variable ‘‘years of schooling completed relative to peers’’
rather than a straight ‘‘years of schooling completed’’ for two reasons.
First, a substantial number of individuals in the sample were younger than
18 at the baseline and therefore had not necessarily completed their edu-
cation. As such, years of schooling at the baseline might be less correlated
with a move by 2004 than, say, eventual completed years of schooling.
Second, akin to this concern, years of schooling is highly correlated with
age for individuals of school-going age. The regressions also include a set
of age variables, defined in broad age groups (for ease of interpretation
and discussion of results). One consequence could be that years of school-
ing at the baseline would pick up at least some age effect. To address this
concern, rather than use education in years, we constructed a variable of
education relative to peers: the absolute deviation of education levels
compared with mean education of age-specific peers at the baseline for
those younger than 18 and relative to other adults for the rest of the sam-
ple. This purges the education variable of an age effect it would otherwise
pick up. All the regressions below were repeated using a straightforward
‘‘years of schooling’’ variable rather than our ‘‘years of schooling relative
to peers’’ variable. Neither the results nor their interpretation were
affected.
6 The noninteracted variables are all included as determinants of con-
sumption growth via Xi and dih.
1018 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
are expected to move to the community of their husbands
after marriage, and husbands are expected to stay where
their father was based. We include an indicator for being
the son of the household head at baseline. Although both
sons and daughters of the head may be expected to be more
likely to stay in the community than other initial household
members, patrilocality would make this probability higher
for boys than for girls.
In sum, this means we are using a set of six instruments.
Although we will show in the appendix that statistically
convincing and close to identical results are obtained by
using subsets of these instruments, we focus on the full set
of instruments in the discussion of the results.
Although our main measure of migration (Mi) is an indi-
cator for having moved, we also substitute this for the log
of the distance moved (kilometers from the original com-
munity of the location in which the individual was found in
2004, ‘‘as the crow flies,’’ set to 0 for nonmovers). We also
extend the multivariate analysis to explore whether moving
to a more urbanized area or changing employment sectors
plays a role in increasing consumption growth.
VI. Regression Results
Table 9 presents the basic results for the initial household
fixed effects (IHHFE) and 2SLS estimates. (Table A1 pre-
sents the means and standard deviations for the covariates.)
We estimate the regressions using an indicator for having
moved and a measure of the distance of the move. The
2SLS estimates in columns 3 and 4 use the six instruments
defined above. In table 10, we present the first-stage results
of regressions explaining migration or the distance traveled
in migration.
Before turning to the variables of interest, we briefly dis-
cuss the coefficients on the control variables. Recall that all
effects are identified using variation within initial house-
hold. Those who are relatively better educated at baseline,
relative to their peers and within the household, experi-
enced much higher consumption growth, and the effect is
strongly convex. Having an educated father has an addi-
tional effect on growth. The younger cohort did consider-
ably better, as did males still unmarried at baseline.
Turning to the migration variables, we observe in the
IHHFE regression a larger and statistically significant
impact of migration on consumption growth. Moving out of
the community resulted in a 36 percentage point increase
in consumption growth over the thirteen-year period. As
migrants move farther from their baseline community, the
impact is greater. These effects are large, with migration
resulting in a large divergence in income between people
who initially lived together—usually parents, siblings, and
other close relatives. Because this is the impact comparing
within families, it nets out any transfers from migrants to
nonmovers. That is, if migrants sent remittances back to
their origin households, then the estimates in table 9 are a
lower bound of the impact of moving (see also the results in
the next section on alternative definitions of the consump-
tion aggregate, excluding transfers out). It also seems coun-
ter to the theory that the migration decision is part of a
household-level maximization strategy (although it cannot
preclude that this is partly true).
For the first-stage results in table 10, in terms of basic
diagnostics, our set of excluded instruments appears strong
and valid: the Cragg-Donald (F) test shows a value of 11.70
for the movement dummy and 9.07 for the distance regres-
sion. Especially in the former case, it is comfortably above
the level of 10 often recommended for rejecting weak
instruments (and in the latter case, still with relative limited
bias in the tables in Stock & Yogo, 2002). The results
are also robust to exclusion of any of the instruments (see
table A2).
Some interesting patterns explaining migration emerge
from table 10. First, education offers strong and convex
effects in leaving one’s community. Being unmarried, espe-
cially being female and unmarried, is correlated with a
higher probability of migration (consistent with patrilocal-
ity, whereby females move out of the paternal location at
the time of marriage). When looking more specifically at
the identifying instruments, we find significant effects, con-
sistent with expectations: positional variables in the house-
hold matter, with the head and spouse less likely to leave,
as are children of the head (relative to others belonging to
the household). The effect is, however, considerably larger
(more negative) for male children of the head—again con-
sistent with patrilocality, as marriage norms make sons
more likely to be expected to stay in the community than
daughters. Older members among the children in the house-
hold are more likely to migrate, possibly reflecting some
kind of pecking order, given the opportunities available.
Rainfall shocks increase the probability of leaving. Finally,
pull factors, like the interaction of being young, male, and
residing close to the regional capital, increase the probabil-
ity of leaving. The results are also consistent for the regres-
sions with the dummy variable for migration and with the
distance-migrated variable. In short, although not aiming to
obtain a structural model, we find suggestive correlates for
the process of migration from within households. These
include better income opportunities (education and distance
to the regional capital), norms of settlement and marriage,
and other social factors.
The 2SLS results (IV with fixed effects) in columns 3
and 4 of table 9 are almost identical to the IHHFE results.
They are slightly less statistically significant (as can be
expected from IV regressions given their lower efficiency)
but still significant at 5%. Thus, there is no evidence that
unobserved individual time-varying heterogeneity affects
the noninstrumented results. For the distance variables, the
results are marginally smaller (the coefficient is 0.10 com-
pared with 0.12), suggesting limited evidence of a positive
bias in the earlier results (migrants traveling longer dis-
tances are those with somewhat higher unobserved con-
sumption growth potential, consistent with expectations).
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TABLE 9.—EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION CHANGE: IHHFE AND 2SLS WITH IHHFE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IHHFE IHHFE 2SLS with IHHFE 2SLS with IHHFE
Moved outside community 0.363*** 0.378**
(0.025) (0.150)
Kilometers moved (log of distance) 0.120*** 0.104**
(0.006) (0.043)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.013** 0.009 0.013** 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.010
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Unmarried 0.023 0.020 0.027 0.011
(0.056) (0.054) (0.064) (0.060)
Unmarried male 0.141*** 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.123**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.053) (0.049)
Both parents died 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.010
(0.084) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.050 0.024 0.048 0.033
(0.100) (0.098) (0.101) (0.100)
Years of education mother 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Years of education father 0.008* 0.007 0.008* 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Female children 0–5 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.025
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Male children 6–10 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.014
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Female children 6–10 0.045 0.056 0.046 0.055
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Male children 11–15 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.016
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Female children 11–15 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Male children 16–20 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.001
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Female children 16–20 0.085* 0.093** 0.085* 0.094**
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Male children 21þ 0.033 0.026 0.033 0.028
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
Female children 21þ 0.073 0.094* 0.072 0.094*
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Number of children residing outside household 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Kilometers from regional capital  number outside children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.149***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.040)
16–25 years 0.059 0.059 0.056 0.069
(0.039) (0.038) (0.049) (0.045)
26–35 years 0.108* 0.105* 0.107* 0.108*
(0.065) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063)
36–45 years 0.132* 0.130* 0.130 0.135*
(0.080) (0.078) (0.081) (0.079)
46–55 years 0.149 0.163* 0.148 0.164*
(0.091) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088)
56–65 years 0.118 0.123 0.118 0.124
(0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.095)
66þ years 0.180 0.168 0.179 0.172
(0.121) (0.118) (0.120) (0.118)
Constant 0.023 0.013
(0.064) (0.063)
Cragg-Donald 11.86 9.33
Sargan statistic 6.26 7.28
Sargan p-value 0.28 0.20
Number of observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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TABLE 10.—FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS OF TABLE 9
(1) (2)
Moved Distance moved
Baseline covariates: Excluded instruments
Head or spouse 0.218*** 0.634***
(0.038) (0.147)
Child of head 0.097*** 0.423***
(0.032) (0.123)
Male child of head 0.114*** 0.334**
(0.037) (0.144)
Age rank in household  age 5–15 14.390* 65.346*
(8.003) (30.884)
Kilometers from regional capital  male  age 5–15 0.001*** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001)
Rainfall shock  age 5–15 0.002** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.003)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.012** 0.071***
(0.005) (0.018)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.003** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.004)
Male 0.017 0.010
(0.030) (0.116)
Unmarried 0.137*** 0.464**
(0.048) (0.187)
Unmarried male 0.105** 0.244
(0.042) (0.164)
Both parents died 0.029 0.261
(0.066) (0.253)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.113 0.562*
(0.079) (0.304)
Years of education mother 0.012*** 0.040**
(0.004) (0.017)
Years of education father 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.015)
Biological children residing in houshold at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.001 0.008
(0.024) (0.093)
Female children 0–5 0.001 0.010
(0.024) (0.092)
Male children 6–10 0.001 0.059
(0.028) (0.107)
Female children 6–10 0.006 0.038
(0.030) (0.116)
Male children 11–15 0.011 0.083
(0.028) (0.110)
Female children 11–15 0.035 0.077
(0.027) (0.105)
Male children 16–20 0.022 0.006
(0.032) (0.125)
Female children 16–20 0.031 0.036
(0.035) (0.134)
Male children 21þ 0.020 0.127
(0.036) (0.137)
Female children 21þ 0.016 0.127
(0.044) (0.169)
Number of children residing outside household 0.008 0.043
(0.009) (0.033)
Kilometers from regional capital  number outside children 0.000** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.284*** 0.886***
(0.054) (0.210)
16–25 years 0.206*** 0.603***
(0.031) (0.118)
26–35 years 0.079 0.246
(0.051) (0.198)
36–45 years 0.135** 0.403*
(0.063) (0.243)
46–55 years 0.079 0.095
(0.071) (0.276)
56–65 years 0.046 0.068
(0.078) (0.300)
66þ years 0.056 0.246
(0.095) (0.366)
Number of observations 3,227 3,227
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Linear probability model (column 1) and OLS (column 2) with household fixed effects.
Still, the difference is remarkably small. The conclusion is
strong: being able to move out of the village or community
appears to be an important factor for consumption growth.
If those who moved had stayed behind, our evidence sug-
gests that they would not have done as well.
The fact that there is little change going from the IHHFE
to the 2SLS results does not suggest that there is no selec-
tion process in the migration decision. For example, it could
be expected that more able people migrate. There is some
evidence that this occurs, yet this heterogeneity is not at the
individual level but at the household level. Estimating the
2SLS without IHHFE increases the coefficient on migrant
status by almost a third (from 0.37 to 0.57). This is consis-
tent with the proposition of positive selection among house-
holds: individuals from households with high earning
potential migrate. Within the household, there seems to be
no unobserved heterogeneity in terms of earning potential
among those who do or do not migrate.
These results are not driven by the lack of a parsimonious
set of instruments or relatively weak instruments. The
results are similar when restricting the instrument set. When
focusing only on the relational variables (head, spouse, son,
daughter), the Cragg-Donald (F) statistics become 14.5 and
11.3, the Sargan is not rejected, the coefficient on physical
movement stays at 0.36, and the distance variable becomes
0.097, virtually identical to the results in table 9.
The validity of our interacted instruments assumes that
they do not capture different growth rates (for example,
because of different labor markets) across these groups
within households. Although growth rates might be influ-
enced by the distance to the regional capital, rainfall
shocks, gender, age, and other characteristics, additively,
there is no evidence to suggest that the interaction of these
would capture different growth rates outside the migration
effect. To explore this point, we exploit the fact that the
1991–1994 baseline data consist of four waves. The wave 1
data were used as the baseline for this paper because the
consumption recall period was identical to the follow-up
survey (wave 5). We use the three interim waves (2–4),
which have similar recall periods, to check the validity of
our interacted instruments. Using a measure of annual con-
sumption per capita growth for 1992–1993, we can check
whether our instruments, appropriately defined for this per-
iod, jointly or individually explain the baseline consump-
tion changes. We find that they do not, giving further confi-
dence that the exclusion restriction is valid for our
instruments: the instruments do not influence growth except
through migration. Of course, this regression of baseline
growth rates on our instruments can be valid only if migra-
tion can be plausibly omitted from it. We do find that 1992
was the year with the lowest and 1993 the third-lowest
migration rates of all the years between 1992 and 2004,
suggesting that the omission of the migration variable from
the regression should not to lead to specification errors. As
can be expected, the same exercise for the regressions in
table 9, with the endogenous moved variable replaced
directly by the instruments, does yield jointly significant
instruments (at 10%).
VII. Robustness
We perform a variety of checks to verify the robustness
of the findings. First, we use alternative definitions of the
consumption aggregate, in particular excluding transfers
out, which could be an important driver of our results if
remittances to one’s origin village are large. We have data
on transfers sent between the 2004 households of the same
origin. The size of these remittances is on average only a
small percentage of total consumption. Our findings are
robust to excluding this component.
Second, we check the role of the configuration of the
data. Our outcomes are household-level measures of con-
sumption per capita in levels and growth, assigned to indi-
viduals. We re-structure the data to the 2004 household
level in tables A3 and A4 (using average characteristics as
controls and appropriately defined household-level aggre-
gated instruments). The results are similar and consistent
regardless, of analyzing the data at the individual or house-
hold level.
Third, concerns may be raised that changes in household
size and composition in new households in 2004 are driving
the results. Table A5 shows that migrant households are
smaller in terms of members or adult-equivalent members.
Table A6 repeats the analysis using adult-equivalent units
rather than household size as the denominator and finds
essentially similar results
Fourth, we investigate whether lack of common support
drives the results. The coefficients in the IHHFE regressions
are identified from the sample households that had split up
from the baseline. Restricting the sample to the 2,940 indi-
viduals from at least two split-offs in 2004 yields identical
results in both the IHHFE and 2SLS estimations. We further
refine this by examining the sample of individuals from ori-
gin households that split off into at least one household that
moved by 2004 (N ¼ 2,520) and the sample of individuals
from origin households that had at least one split-off that
remained in the village (N ¼ 2,777). These samples yield
identical results for both IHHFE and 2SLS. Restricting the
sample further to baseline households that had at least
one split-off that moved and one that remained in the vil-
lage (N ¼ 2,357) yields identical IHHFE results, but has
2SLS estimates of 0.23 and 0.68 for the migration indicator
variable and distance variables, significant at 10% and 7%,
respectively, and with IV diagnostics that remain sound.
Taken together, these sample restrictions do not cast doubt
on the validity of the results, although they suggest that the
size of the effects may be slightly lower than indicated in
table 9.
As an alternative to the fixed-effects model and the two-
stage estimation, we investigate a number of matching
models. Of course, the advantage of matching techniques is
that they ensure comparison of like-with-like, with less
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restrictive functional form assumptions and omission of
noncomparable observations. The disadvantage is that they
ignore potential unobservables (such as ability) that drive
selection into migration. Across an array of different match-
ing techniques (Gaussian, nearest neighbor, Epanechnikov),
the main findings on the impact of migration on consump-
tion gains are remarkably robust to the results in table 10
(results not presented).
Finally, we examine the role of time-varying factors, spe-
cifically education. If migration itself is the result of the indi-
vidual’s efforts to increase his or her level of education, we
might be capturing the gains to a migration-education bun-
dle rather than to migration per se. For secondary schooling,
often in the form of boarding schools in Tanzania, this is a
plausible concern. At the primary level, few people migrate
for schooling opportunities, and tertiary education is limited
for this sample. Descriptively, we find that the likelihood of
a move is not correlated with additional grades of schooling
conditional on age, suggesting that the moves we observe
are not specifically driven by demand for education. Explor-
ing this further, we repeated the regressions in table 9 but
this time included the years of education gained between
rounds, as well as the interaction of schooling gains with the
migration variables. We have to be cautious in interpreting
these results, as surely migrating between rounds and years
of education gained between rounds are bound to be joint
decisions. Nevertheless, the results can at least explore
whether the observed premium is just driven by education
gains. Table 11 shows the results (only reporting the migra-
tion and education variables, but the independent variables
are otherwise identical to those in table 9).7 Our findings are
robust to including education gains. The results in columns 1
and 2 indicate that even controlling for educational gains,
the premium remains high and virtually identical to the ear-
lier results. Including the interaction terms in columns 3 and
4 shows nevertheless that some of the gains may well work
through education: the returns to moves are higher for those
who added more years of schooling, although for those with-
out additional schooling since the baseline, the returns to
movement are still considerable.
VIII. Migration Incentives, Social Constraints, and
Windows of Opportunity
The regressions in tables 9 and 10 are suggestive of how
the relatively traditional and tightly knit society of Kagera
reacted to growing economic opportunities in the past dec-
ade. There is substantial movement out of these commu-
nities, and those moving capture a substantial premium
when measured in consumption terms. At the same time,
the high premium may indicate opportunities that have not
been taken.
In this section, we build a narrative around these results
in four steps. First, we argue that there are windows of
opportunity that arise over time and space in the region, and
people need to move in order to take advantage of these
opportunities. Second, we complete the discussion of the
drivers of migration; the regressions in table 10 used house-
hold fixed effects and therefore do not reveal correlates of
the constraints to migration at the household and commu-
nity levels. Third, we discuss how social norms can prevent
some people from moving. Finally, we argue why such wel-
fare-reducing constraints may be imposed by society on its
members, thus providing a potential answer to the question
of why more people do not move if the payoffs are so high.
At the end of this section, we discuss what our results imply
in terms of standard models of migration and qualify this
discussion by offering a few alternatives that cannot be
rejected given the data available.
The economic landscape in the Kagera region, as in other
regions in Africa, has been changing in the past two decades.
TABLE 11.—EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION CHANGE: IHHFE, WITH CHANGE IN SCHOOLING AND INTERACTIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IHHFE IHHFE IHHFE IHHFE
Coefficient/se Coefficient/se Coefficient/se Coefficient/se
Moved outside community 0.364*** 0.262***
(0.025) (0.033)
Kilometers moved 0.120*** 0.099***
(0.006) (0.009)
Gains in years of education 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.005 0.010*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Gains in education  moved dummy 0.033***
(0.007)
Gains in education  kilometers moved 0.006***
(0.002)
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.017*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 3,226 3,226 3,226 3,226
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Number of observations is 1 less than table 9 due to 1 excluded observation missing 2004 education. Other controls reported in table 9 are included but not reported.
7 Only the IHHFE and not the 2SLS results are reported here. When
estimating the first column using 2SLS with the same instruments as
before, but also including the education gained in the first and second
stages, gave close to identical results as the IHHFE regressions (not
shown). In the first-stage regression, the variable additional years of edu-
cation gained is not correlated with the likelihood of moving, conditional
on age.
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Growth opportunities are continually being introduced and
eliminated across time and space, as the refugee crisis
abates, links with war-ridden bordering countries change,
and more localized negative and positive shocks manifest
themselves with various degrees of severity. People need to
be physically (geographically) mobile in order to respond
to the opportunities. To elaborate on this point, we decom-
pose the results of table 9 further to examine the role of the
location of a move (more or less remote areas) and moves
associated with sector changes (out of agriculture into non-
agricultural activities). Table 12 disaggregates the migra-
tion variable into three categories of migration (moving to a
more or less connected or urbanized area). Even moving to
a less connected area is still correlated with higher growth
compared with not moving, but moving to a more con-
nected area results in consumption growth that is 66 percen-
tage points higher than not moving. The same result is
found using the distance of the move in the second column.
Although where individuals move matters for the magni-
tude of the effect, any movement has the potential to be
welfare improving.
In table 13, we interact migration with change in sector
(out of agriculture). We pool people who moved out of agri-
culture and those who remained in nonagriculture. Both
groups had statistically indistinguishable findings in all
regressions. The first column shows that moving out of agri-
culture is strongly linked to higher consumption growth (as
noted above in the descriptive statistics). The next two col-
umns show a large and positive impact of moving, even
after controlling sector shifts; there is also a strong interac-
tive effect of this sector shift with physical movement out
of the village. In other words, it is not just the move out of
agriculture that accounts for the large growth differential;
migration as physical movement out of the village has
strong additional and complementary effects.
Tables 12 and 13 thus show that movement in itself is
important. A logical—for economists, perhaps even tautolo-
gical—consequence of this is that constraints to movement
are impediments to growth for whomever they happen to
constrain. To estimate the migration premium, the regres-
sions in tables 9 and 10 use initial household fixed effects.
Any initial household and community characteristics are
therefore a black box. Although this improves inference
regarding the migration premium, it also offers an incom-
plete narrative of why certain people migrate and therefore
TABLE 12.—EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION CHANGE: IHHFE, CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE MOVE
(1) (2)
IHHFE IHHFE
Characteristics of the move
Move to more remote area 0.176***
(0.036)
Move to similar area 0.274***
(0.034)
Move to more connected area 0.661***
(0.037)
Kilometers moved 0.073***
(0.011)
Distance moved if to similar area 0.032**
(0.015)
Distance moved if to more connected area 0.070***
(0.013)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.010* 0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
Squared deviation of years
schooling from peers
0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.004 0.008
(0.037) (0.037)
Unmarried 0.008 0.006
(0.054) (0.054)
Unmarried male 0.127*** 0.121***
(0.044) (0.043)
Both parents died 0.005 0.025
(0.082) (0.081)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.053 0.020
(0.098) (0.097)
Years of education mother 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Years of education father 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.021 0.023
(0.030) (0.030)
Female children 0–5 0.026 0.025
(0.029) (0.029)
Male children 6–10 0.008 0.015
(0.034) (0.034)
Female children 6–10 0.048 0.056
(0.037) (0.036)
Male children 11–15 0.023 0.022
(0.035) (0.035)
Female children 11–15 0.010 0.011
(0.034) (0.033)
Male children 16–20 0.012 0.002
(0.040) (0.040)
Female children 16–20 0.085* 0.095**
(0.043) (0.043)
Male children 21þ 0.023 0.020
(0.044) (0.044)
Female children 21þ 0.090* 0.099*
(0.054) (0.054)
Number of children residing
outside household
0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
Kilometers from regional capital 
number outside children
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.141*** 0.143***
(0.029) (0.028)
16–25 years 0.063* 0.066*
(0.038) (0.038)
26–35 years 0.107* 0.102
(0.063) (0.063)
36–45 years 0.130* 0.131*
(0.078) (0.077)
46–55 years 0.164* 0.166*
(0.088) (0.088)
TABLE 12.—(CONTINUED)
(1) (2)
IHHFE IHHFE
56–65 years 0.135 0.127
(0.096) (0.095)
66þ years 0.190 0.169
(0.118) (0.117)
Constant 0.015 0.007
(0.063) (0.062)
Number of observations 3,227 3,227
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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TABLE 13.—EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION CHANGE: IHHFE, MOVING OUT OF AGRICULTURE
(1) (2) (3)
IHHFE IHHFE IHHFE
Characteristics of the move
Moved outside community 0.195***
(0.034)
Kilometers moved (log of distance) 0.073***
(0.011)
Moved out of agriculture 0.407*** 0.126*** 0.175***
(0.034) (0.044) (0.040)
Moved outside community and out of agriculture 0.449***
(0.059)
Distance moved  moved out of agriculture 0.075***
(0.015)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.013* 0.011* 0.010
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.004** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.059 0.020 0.030
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Unmarried 0.005 0.059 0.049
(0.063) (0.061) (0.060)
Unmarried male 0.079 0.128** 0.132***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.049)
Both parents died 0.066 0.045 0.022
(0.113) (0.108) (0.108)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.110 0.076 0.045
(0.126) (0.121) (0.120)
Years of education mother 0.005 0.002 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Years of education father 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.048 0.047 0.044
(0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
Female children 0–5 0.029 0.018 0.020
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Male children 6–10 0.023 0.014 0.024
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037)
Female children 6–10 0.057 0.056 0.067
(0.043) (0.041) (0.041)
Male children 11–15 0.018 0.010 0.023
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
Female children 11–15 0.004 0.010 0.008
(0.039) (0.037) (0.037)
Male children 16–20 0.024 0.009 0.011
(0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Female children 16–20 0.100** 0.103** 0.111**
(0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
Male children 21þ 0.027 0.013 0.005
(0.053) (0.051) (0.050)
Female children 21þ 0.141** 0.103 0.119*
(0.067) (0.064) (0.064)
Number of children residing outside household 0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Kilometers from regional capital  number outside children 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.177*** 0.132*** 0.135***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
16–25 years 0.058 0.029 0.029
(0.057) (0.055) (0.054)
26–35 years 0.063 0.082 0.078
(0.083) (0.079) (0.079)
36–45 years 0.077 0.085 0.077
(0.098) (0.094) (0.093)
46–55 years 0.103 0.128 0.133
(0.110) (0.106) (0.105)
56–65 years 0.091 0.105 0.113
(0.119) (0.114) (0.114)
66þ years 0.195 0.246* 0.233
(0.156) (0.149) (0.148)
Constant 0.084 0.054 0.057
(0.082) (0.079) (0.078)
Number of observations 2,546 2,546 2,546
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
why the migration premium remains so high. To explore
this, we replaced the initial household fixed effect in table
10 by a set of household and community variables as mea-
sured at baseline. We include characteristics of the head of
the household (age, sex, and years of education), household
size, a dummy for whether the household is a farm house-
hold, and wealth characteristics (land for cultivation, con-
sumption per capita, the value of the physical capital stock,
and the flooring quality in the dwelling). The community
variables included are the cluster (village) means of all the
above characteristics, the distance to Bukoba (the regional
capital), and whether the community is remote (defined as
an area not closely connected to an urban center).
The results are shown in table 14 (only the additional
variables are reported as inference on the role of individual
characteristics was superior in table 10). The table offers
the marginal effects from a probit regression on whether an
individual moved and the coefficients from an OLS regres-
sion explaining the logarithm of the distance migrated.
We find suggestive evidence of some factors that matter
for the migration decision. First, we find some weak evi-
dence that migration is higher in communities where farm-
ing was still the most important activity for a higher number
of families, at least with respect to the distance of moves
(column 2). The median community in the sample has 83%
of households mainly involved in agriculture. However,
controlling for this, being a farmer decreases the probability
of any move and the distance migrated. Those with more
land do not migrate as far as those with less land. Taken
together, this suggests that migration is to some extent dri-
ven by a move out of agricultural settings, but those not
involved in agriculture and faced with land pressure are
more likely to move away and move farther.
Second, the regression results reported in table 10 show
that education matters in explaining the migration of the
individual, but table 14 shows that the educational level of
the family or community does not matter: there is no more
or further migration from households or settings with more
education. Similarly, although living in better-connected
areas is positively associated with the probability of mov-
ing, it is not associated with distance, and being closer to
the regional capital is not associated with either migration
measure.
Finally, are there any wealth or credit constraint effects?
Migration may be a costly activity, requiring a serious
investment. It is also an indivisible investment. Thus, some
households may not be able to afford any migration to take
advantage of the high return or can afford to have only
some members migrate. From figures 3, 4, and 5, the sam-
ples of future movers and nonmovers started off with rela-
tively similar wealth distributions. The evidence from table
14 is mixed. Among the household indicators, only the
value of physical assets is associated negatively with mov-
ing. Neither consumption per capita nor good flooring is
associated with migration. None of the community-mean
wealth variables are statistically associated with migration.
Overall, there is little evidence of credit or wealth con-
straints; if anything, there is a tendency for more migration
from poorer households.
This still leaves open the question as to why more people
do not migrate, given the high returns. The individual-level
variables in the regressions in table 10 suggest that particu-
lar types of people within families can go and not others.
Factors include individual education (with a convex effect),
being unmarried and female (consistent with considerable
migration for marriage by girls), being of a particular age
group when rainfall shocks occur, and a series of positional
variables in the household (including an age pecking order
and gender effects). Distance to the regional capital, a migra-
tion pull factor, matters specifically for young males.
TABLE 14.—EXPLAINING MIGRATION, HOUSEHOLD, AND COMMUNITY CORRELATES
(1) (2)
Probit:
Moved out of
Community
OLS: Kilometers
Moved (Log
of Distance)
Sex of household head 0.012 0.105
(0.026) (0.093)
Age of household head 0.001 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002)
Education of household head 0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.015)
Household size 0.000 0.014
(0.003) (0.012)
Primary occupation is farming 0.064** 0.355***
(0.031) (0.099)
Acres of land cultivated 0.003 0.014*
(0.002) (0.008)
Consumption per capita
(in millions of TSh)
0.021 0.674
(0.124) (0.419)
Value of physical assets
(in millions of TSh)
0.008* 0.024*
(0.005) (0.014)
Good flooring in dwelling 0.003 0.097
(0.031) (0.105)
Kilometers from cluster to Bukoba 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Remote community 0.047** 0.078
(0.020) (0.068)
Cluster mean of household characteristics
Sex of household head 0.207* 0.068
(0.120) (0.411)
Age of household head 0.002 0.017**
(0.002) (0.008)
Education of household head 0.005 0.017
(0.013) (0.043)
Household size 0.007 0.049*
(0.008) (0.028)
Primary occupation is farming 0.110 0.500*
(0.087) (0.289)
Acres of land cultivated 0.001 0.012
(0.007) (0.023)
Consumption per capita
(in millions of TSh)
0.256 1.545
(0.362) (1.224)
Value of physical assets
(in millions of TSh)
0.007 0.013
(0.015) (0.053)
Good flooring in dwelling 0.028 0.152
(0.084) (0.286)
Constant 0.825
(0.755)
Number of observations 3,119 3,119
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%. Column 1 presents the mar-
ginal effects from a probit estimation. Individual characteristics included in table 10 specifications are
also included here, but are not presented in the table. The sample is slightly reduced (from 3,227) due to
missing information on baseline value of physical stock for 108 households.
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There is scope for further interpretation of these findings
within the local social context. The regressions suggest that
an individual needs to be in a position to move in order to
take advantage of geographic and time-specific economic
opportunities, while at the same time a number of crucial
social constraints in place may prevent an individual from
doing so. Social and family norms interacting with pull
(nearby towns) and push (shocks) factors are determinants
of who may be allowed (or chosen) to move.
There appear to be windows of opportunity—being in the
right place at the right time—that certain categories of peo-
ple can take advantage of: not having social and family con-
straints in a window of time when physical mobility has
large payoffs. Missing these windows implies remaining
trapped in a low-return environment. But this still begs the
question of why we do not see more migration given these
high returns and why barriers remain in place if they are
welfare reducing.
Our results are consistent with the literature that links
network externalities to poverty traps and so endogenizes
exit barriers in the village. In Hoff and Sen (2006), the kin-
ship group decides how high to set the exit barrier for its
members. They start from the observation that kin who
have moved and remain loyal to their kinship group at
home will sometimes need to undertake actions with nega-
tive consequences for their employers (securing jobs for
kin) or landlords (sharing housing). This creates an entry
barrier for anyone with obvious, strong kinship ties to their
home village. In order to overcome such entry barriers, an
individual may have to sever ties with his or her kinship
group, implying the loss of a productive element (from the
kinship group’s point of view). To avoid this ex ante, the
kinship group may decide to manipulate exit barriers, rais-
ing them through social norms about migration in order not
to lose productive members. Hoff and Sen’s model finds
that it may be in the interest of the kinship group to prevent
some of its members from taking advantage of economic
opportunities.
Our results offer an empirical qualification of this basic
result and suggest that exit barriers are not equal over time
because they depend on interactions among gender, age,
age rank, and the degree of connectedness to the household
head. Furthermore, our results suggest that exit barriers are
binding constraints only when geographic and time-specific
push or pull factors offer a window for economic advance-
ment through migration.
Are our results consistent with standard models of migra-
tion? As in Harris and Todaro (1970), higher benefits
appear to drive migration. In their model, the assumption of
unemployment in the urban sector allows the persistence of
a wage premium between urban and rural areas, linked to
urban unemployment in a context of imperfect labor mar-
kets. In equilibrium, expected urban earnings (across work-
ers and the unemployed) are equal to rural earnings (Harris
& Todaro, 1970). As a result, observing living standards in
urban areas to be above those in rural areas would suggest
that equilibrium has not yet been attained, with continuing
streams of migrants, so our results are inconsistent with the
migration equilibrium, provided that expectations reflect
true conditions.8 We cannot discount that we may be obser-
ving the migration process in a state of disequilibrium as
part of a dynamic adjustment process to a long-run equili-
brium with equal returns in expectation. Nevertheless, the
scale of the disequilibrium is not easily explained given the
available data and the results in tables 10 and 13.
Other interpretations can nevertheless be offered as to
why migration may be limited despite high returns in con-
sumption terms. Consumption may be a poor measure of
the overall net welfare benefit of migration. People may
find the alienation from their original home environment
costly in subjective terms. For example, a recent resurvey
of the ICRISAT households in six villages in Maharashtra
and Andhra Pradesh in India used a similar tracking metho-
dology to the current paper (Dercon, Krishnan, & Krutikov,
2009). Tracking all the people living in the original 240
ICRISAT households from 1975 to 1984, the study found
that by 2004, those who had migrated had a premium of
about 20% in consumption, controlling for initial household
fixed effects. However, again controlling for initial house-
hold fixed effects, there was a negative premium on being a
migrant in regressions with subjective well-being or subjec-
tive assessment of overall wealth as the dependent variable.
In short, migrants had higher consumption in real terms but
lower subjective well-being compared with those from the
same original households who did not migrate, possibly as
if a premium in terms of the former is required to compen-
sate for the latter. In such circumstances, there is no reason
that the consumption of migrants would ever equate to the
consumption of nonmigrants; a gap would remain.
IX. Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of migration on poverty
and living standards in Tanzania. We use a unique thirteen-
year panel data set, offering information on split-off house-
holds and migrants. Assessing the impact of migration on
living standards is particularly difficult because we cannot
observe someone to be a migrant and remain in the original
community at the same time. A relatively simple differ-
8 In principle, deviation of the estimated average difference between
urban and rural living standards expost could also be possible in equili-
brium in a Harris-Todaro-style model. For this to explain the apparent
less-than-optimal migration levels, it would need to be the case that the
gap in living standards between urban and rural areas was expected to be
much lower than is now apparent. This could come about if expectations
were not rational; if there was an unexpected higher level of urban wages
by 2004; or, for example, if there was much higher employment in well-
paid jobs. The premium seems to be too high for this to be a sufficient
explanation, most likely because although urban wages may be high,
unemployment levels for particular groups are also high. More than 20%
of the urban population between ages 18 and 34 is unemployed, in the
sense that they are looking for work and available for work. Unemploy-
ment is double this figure using the national definition, which includes
those with marginal or precarious job situations (United Republic of Tan-
zania, 2007).
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ence-in-difference model is used to assess the impact of
migration on consumption levels, thereby controlling for
fixed individual heterogeneity in determining the level of
consumption. Furthermore, we can identify the impact of
migration on the growth rate of consumption using within-
household variation in the subsequent migration of indivi-
dual members. This initial household fixed-effects estimator
controls for the unobserved heterogeneity in the growth rate
of consumption that is common among baseline household
members. Finally, a number of specific individual factors
are added as controls, and IV estimates are also presented.
We avoid identifying the migration decision based on the
household circumstances (such as shocks, distance to poten-
tial areas of destination, and existence of family networks)
used in most studies of migration impacts, but that are
unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
The identified effects are remarkably large and robust:
migrants experienced 36 percentage points higher consump-
tion growth compared with those who stayed behind. We
also find that transfers from migrants to nonmigrating
household members are relatively limited. We find sugges-
tive evidence that it matters where one moves. Moving to
more connected areas has substantially higher returns, but
even moving to a less connected area is correlated with
higher growth. Moving into nonagricultural activities con-
tributes to consumption growth, but this growth is always
greater in any sector or activity if the individual physically
moved.
Relative to the theory, this paper offers evidence consis-
tent with features in the original Lewis model, with persis-
tent wage differentials, at least at this stage of the rural
transformation.9 Relative to the new economics of migra-
tion, the evidence is less conclusive. The robust difference
in welfare levels between those who migrated and those
who did not is not consistent with either complete altruism
or risk sharing, although it is possible that the results reflect
partial risk sharing and some transfers. We offer suggestive
evidence that some transfers indeed occur, but they are rela-
tively limited from those who migrated long distances.
Because we have not constructed a structural model of
migration (only a first stage in a 2SLS procedure), our evi-
dence does not shed full light on the migration process.
However, we provide suggestive evidence that within-
family social structures matter for who gets the opportunity
to migrate, how far they go, and who, therefore, can move
up economically in Tanzania. This evidence also helps us
to understand better how our results relate to the predictions
of the Harris-Todaro model. Unlike the equilibrium condi-
tions in Harris-Todaro, on average the premium on migra-
tion is positive and rather large: in expectation, earnings do
not appear to be equalized, suggesting that equilibrium has
not been obtained, and returns to migration remain high.
There appear to be barriers to physical movement, so that
potential returns are unexploited. Our evidence suggests
that just as in Hoff and Sen (2006), some of these barriers
may be exit barriers that result in less-than-efficient levels
of migration. Alternatively, other welfare costs related to
migration may also limit migration.
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TABLE APPENDIX
TABLE A2.—ALTERNATIVE SETS OF INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
Excluded Instrumental Variable:
All Included
Head or
Spouse
Child of
Head
Male Child
of Head
Age Rank in
Household 
Age 5–15
Kilometers from
Regional Capital 
Male  Age 5–15
Avgerage
Rainfall Shock 
Age 5–15
Moved outside community
Coefficient 0.38 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.36
Standard error 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
Cragg-Donald 11.86 7.62 12.36 12.32 13.58 12.54 12.89
Kilometers moved (log of distance)
Coefficient 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
Standard error 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
Cragg-Donald 9.33 7.45 8.81 10.11 10.29 10.23 9.87
Each coefficient is generated from a separate regression based on the 2SLS specification in table 10.
TABLE A1.—SAMPLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Mean s.d.
Change in (logged) consumption per capita 0.26 (0.77)
Moved 0.33 (0.47)
Distance moved (kms) 35.02 (145.01)
Distance moved variable: log(kms þ 1) 1.06 (1.78)
Baseline covariates: Excluded instruments
Head or spouse 0.26 (0.44)
Child of head 0.49 (0.50)
Male child of head 0.25 (0.43)
Age rank in household  age 5–15 0.00 (0.00)
Kilometers from regional capital 
male  age 5—15
12.04 (38.43)
Rainfall shock (annual centimeters
deviation)  age 5–15
18.51 (28.71)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.25 (2.24)
Squared deviation of years schooling
from peers
5.08 (9.50)
Male 0.47 (0.50)
Unmarried 0.69 (0.46)
Unmarried male 0.36 (0.48)
Both parents died 0.05 (0.22)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.02 (0.15)
Years of education mother 2.72 (3.02)
Years of education father 4.23 (3.32)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.15 (0.45)
Female children 0–5 0.14 (0.45)
Male children 6–10 0.10 (0.36)
Female children 6–10 0.09 (0.34)
Male children 11–15 0.10 (0.36)
Female children 11–15 0.11 (0.38)
Male children 16–20 0.06 (0.29)
Female children 16–20 0.06 (0.28)
Male children 21þ 0.05 (0.26)
Female children 21þ 0.04 (0.21)
Number of children residing outside
household
0.64 (1.83)
Kilometers from regional capital  number
outside children
44.62 (184.60)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.35 (0.48)
16–25 years 0.20 (0.40)
26–35 years 0.08 (0.27)
36–45 years 0.07 (0.26)
46–55 years 0.06 (0.23)
56–65 years 0.04 (0.20)
66þ years 0.02 (0.12)
Number of observations 3,227
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TABLE A3.—EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION CHANGE: IHHFE AND 2SLS, HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL RESULTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IHHFE IHHFE 2SLS 2SLS
Moved outside community 0.321*** 0.520***
(0.038) (0.154)
Kilometers moved (log of distance) 0.112*** 0.146***
(0.009) (0.045)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.085 0.067 0.115 0.076
(0.096) (0.093) (0.098) (0.093)
Unmarried 0.114 0.117 0.144 0.132
(0.101) (0.098) (0.104) (0.100)
Unmarried male 0.179* 0.182* 0.208** 0.197**
(0.102) (0.099) (0.104) (0.101)
Both parents died 0.079 0.042 0.080 0.032
(0.136) (0.133) (0.136) (0.133)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.124 0.066 0.092 0.034
(0.175) (0.171) (0.177) (0.175)
Years of education mother 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Years of education father 0.016* 0.015* 0.017* 0.015*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.049 0.042 0.049 0.040
(0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.072)
Female children 0–5 0.014 0.019 0.040 0.034
(0.078) (0.076) (0.081) (0.078)
Male children 6–10 0.112 0.097 0.101 0.087
(0.090) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088)
Female children 6–10 0.181* 0.209** 0.179* 0.216**
(0.090) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088)
Male children 11–15 0.046 0.051 0.042 0.051
(0.076) (0.074) (0.076) (0.073)
Female children 11–15 0.046 0.045 0.018 0.031
(0.083) (0.081) (0.086) (0.082)
Male children 16–20 0.040 0.024 0.054 0.026
(0.088) (0.086) (0.089) (0.085)
Female children 16–20 0.200** 0.214** 0.174* 0.206**
(0.105) (0.102) (0.107) (0.102)
Male children 21þ 0.046 0.041 0.035 0.035
(0.105) (0.102) (0.105) (0.102)
Female children 21þ 0.204 0.237* 0.166 0.229*
(0.126) (0.122) (0.129) (0.122)
Number of children residing outside household 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.000
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Kilometers from regional capital  number outside children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.245*** 0.246*** 0.215*** 0.229***
(0.062) (0.060) (0.066) (0.063)
16–25 years 0.060 0.066 0.047 0.058
(0.071) (0.069) (0.072) (0.069)
26–35 years 0.152 0.160 0.196 0.183
(0.131) (0.127) (0.135) (0.130)
36–45 years 0.141 0.167 0.155 0.161
(0.168) (0.163) (0.168) (0.163)
46–55 years 0.206 0.264 0.278 0.312*
(0.187) (0.182) (0.194) (0.193)
56–65 years 0.144 0.180 0.243 0.231
(0.199) (0.193) (0.212) (0.206)
66þ years 0.336 0.344 0.384* 0.357
(0.236) (0.229) (0.238) (0.230)
Constant 0.025 0.019
(0.129) (0.125)
Cragg-Donald 13.68 9.10
Sargan statistic 5.67 7.76
Sargan p-value 0.34 0.17
Number of observations 1,909 1,909 1,909 1,909
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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TABLE A4.—FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS OF TABLE A3
(1) (2)
Moved Distance Moved
Baseline covariates: excluded instruments
Head or spouse 0.179*** 0.479*
(0.063) (0.254)
Child of head 0.058 0.343*
(0.048) (0.193)
Male child of head 0.157*** 0.455**
(0.056) (0.227)
Age rank in household  age 5–15 7.379 1.269
(12.036) (48.763)
Kilometers from regional capital  male  age 5–15 0.001* 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Rainfall shock  age 5–15 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.007 0.070**
(0.007) (0.030)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.003** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.006)
Male 0.126* 0.233
(0.070) (0.282)
Unmarried 0.095 0.364
(0.075) (0.306)
Unmarried male 0.022 0.073
(0.079) (0.322)
Both parents died 0.019 0.276
(0.098) (0.396)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.160 0.974*
(0.125) (0.507)
Years of education mother 0.015** 0.060**
(0.007) (0.028)
Years of education father 0.010 0.019
(0.007) (0.027)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.016 0.011
(0.053) (0.216)
Female children 0–5 0.082 0.246
(0.056) (0.229)
Male children 6–10 0.007 0.162
(0.065) (0.263)
Female children 6–10 0.005 0.221
(0.066) (0.267)
Male children 11–15 0.037 0.045
(0.055) (0.224)
Female children 11–15 0.087 0.274
(0.061) (0.246)
Male children 16–20 0.061 0.040
(0.063) (0.257)
Female children 16–20 0.105 0.169
(0.075) (0.304)
Male children 21þ 0.063 0.239
(0.075) (0.305)
Female children 21þ 0.156* 0.168
(0.091) (0.369)
Number of children residing outside household 0.006 0.001
(0.016) (0.064)
Kilometers from regional capital  number outside children 0.000** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.454*** 1.351***
(0.072) (0.292)
16–25 years 0.032 0.046
(0.052) (0.209)
26–35 years 0.227** 0.745*
(0.094) (0.383)
36–45 years 0.089 0.389
(0.121) (0.491)
46–55 years 0.340** 1.521***
(0.135) (0.548)
56–65 years 0.433*** 1.549***
(0.144) (0.582)
66þ years 0.239 0.727
(0.170) (0.688)
Number of observations 1,909 1,909
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
TABLE A6.—EXPLAINING CONSUMPTION CHANGE: IHHFE AND 2SLS ADULT EQUIVALENT CONSUMPTION (RATHER THAN PER CAPITA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IHHFE IHHFE 2SLS with IHHFE 2SLS with IHHFE
Moved outside community 0.363*** 0.426***
(0.024) (0.143)
Kilometers moved (log of distance) 0.117*** 0.123***
(0.006) (0.041)
Individual characteristics at baseline
Deviation of years schooling from peers 0.014** 0.010* 0.013** 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Squared deviation of years schooling from peers 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.010 0.016 0.008 0.016
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Unmarried 0.043 0.048 0.030 0.045
(0.053) (0.051) (0.060) (0.057)
Unmarried male 0.087** 0.076* 0.099* 0.079*
(0.043) (0.041) (0.051) (0.046)
Both parents died 0.007 0.026 0.009 0.027
(0.079) (0.077) (0.079) (0.077)
Above 15 and both parents died 0.032 0.008 0.026 0.005
(0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.095)
Years of education mother 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Years of education father 0.008* 0.007 0.008* 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Biological children residing in household at baseline
Male children 0–5 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Female children 0–5 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.024
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Male children 6–10 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.006
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Female children 6–10 0.042 0.052 0.042 0.053
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Male children 11–15 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Female children 11–15 0.014 0.019 0.011 0.018
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Male children 16–20 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
Female children 16–20 0.056 0.064 0.054 0.064
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Male children 21þ 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.005
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Female children 21þ 0.066 0.087* 0.063 0.087*
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
Number of children residing outside household 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Kilometers from regional capital  number outside children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TABLE A5.—HOUSEHOLD SIZE AT BASELINE AND FOLLOW-UP, BY MOBILITY CATEGORIES, MEAN (MEDIAN)
Household Size Household Size: Adult Equivalent
1991 2004 1991 2004 N
Same village 7.71 5.98 6.15 4.94 2,150
(7.0) (6.0) (5.7) (4.6)
Neighboring community 8.20 4.93 6.59 3.87 400
(7.0) (5.0) (5.9) (3.4)
Elsewhere in Kagera 7.65 4.47 6.17 3.55 437
(7.0) (4.0) (6.0) (3.2)
Outside Kagera 8.45 4.45 6.74 3.69 251
(7.0) (4.0) (6.1) (3.1)
Adult equivalence is defined following the National Bureau of Statistics with varying weights by age and sex.
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TABLE A6.—(CONTINUED)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IHHFE IHHFE 2SLS with IHHFE 2SLS with IHHFE
Age at baseline (1991–1994)
5–15 years 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.187*** 0.199***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.041) (0.038)
16–25 years 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.163*** 0.175***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.046) (0.043)
26–35 years 0.192*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.188***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
36–45 years 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.190** 0.195***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.075)
46–55 years 0.256*** 0.270*** 0.253*** 0.270***
(0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.083)
56–65 years 0.232** 0.238*** 0.231** 0.238***
(0.093) (0.091) (0.093) (0.090)
66þ years 0.313*** 0.302*** 0.310*** 0.300***
(0.114) (0.112) (0.114) (0.111)
Constant 0.137** 0.125**
(0.061) (0.059)
Cragg-Donald 11.86 9.33
Sargan statistic 10.59 11.44
Sargan p-value 0.06 0.04
Number of observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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